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Abstract: This paper derives the HJB (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation for 
sophisticated agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant 
discounting in a continuous setting, by using a dynamic programming approach. A simple 
example is used in order to illustrate the applicability of this HJB equation, by suggesting a 
method for constructing the subgame perfect equilibrium solution to the problem. 
Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with constant 
discounting are analyzed. Special attention is paid to the case of free terminal time. Strotz’s 
model (an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource with non-constant discounting) 
is revisited. 
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Resumen: En este trabajo se deriva la ecuación de Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) para 
un agente sofisticado en un problema de optimización dinámica en tiempo continuo con 
horizonte finito, cuando la tasa de descuento de preferencia temporal es no constante, 
mediante la resolución de un problema de programación dinámica. Un sencillo ejemplo 
sirve para ilustrar la aplicabilidad de esta ecuación HJB. En particular, en el mismo se 
sugiere un método para construir el equilibrio perfecto en subjuegos solución del problema. 
El caso de tiempo final libre recibe una especial atención. Finalmente, se revisa el modelo 
de Strotz (un problema tipo “eating cake” de un recurso no renovable con descuento no 
constante). 
Palabras clave: Descuento no constante, agentes naive y sofisticados, tiempo final libre, 
equivalencia observacional 
 
1 Introduction
Variable rate of time preferences have received considerable attention in recent years.
Effects of the so called hyperbolic discount functions (introduced by Phelps and Pollak
(1968)) have been extensively studied in a discrete time context, within the field of be-
havioural economics. Laibson (1997) has made compelling observations about ways in
which rates of time preference vary. However, this topic has received less attention in a
continuous time setting. The main reason for this may be the complexity involved in the
search for solutions in closed form in the non-constant discounting case. In fact, stan-
dard optimal control techniques cannot be used in this context, since they give rise to
non-consistent policies.
The most relevant effect of non-constant discounting is that preferences change with
time. In this sense, an agent making a decision in time t has different preferences compared
with those in time t′. Therefore, we can consider him at different times as different agents.
An agent making a decision in time t is usually called the t-agent. If the horizon planning
is a finite interval [0, T ], we can understand the optimal control problem with non-constant
discounting as a perfect information sequential game with a continuous number of players
(the t-agents, for t ∈ [0, T ]) making their decisions sequentially. A t-agent can act in
two different ways: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents take decisions without taking
into account that their preferences will change in the near future. Then, they will be
continuously modifying their calculated choices for the future, and their decisions will be
non-time consistent in general. In order to obtain a time consistent strategy, the t-agent
should be sophisticated, in the sense of taking into account the preferences of all the
t′-agents, for t′ ∈ (t, T ]. Therefore, the solution to the problem of the agent with non-
constant discounting should be constructed by looking for the subgame perfect equilibria
of the associated game with the infinite number of t-agents.
Historically, Ramsey (1928) believed that no discounting at all should be used, stat-
ing: “... we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice
which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of imagination”. How-
ever, in the part of his analysis that allowed for time preference, Ramsey (1928) assumes
an exponential discount factor, with constant discount rate, stating: “This is the only
assumption we can make, without contradicting our fundamental hypothesis that succes-
sive generations are activated by the same system of preferences”. The main property of
non-constant discounting is implicit in this statement: it can create a time-consistency
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problem. In fact, Strotz (1956) illustrated how for a very simple model preferences are
time consistent if, and only if, time preferences are exponentials with a constant discount
rate. In order to avoid such time inconsistency, the agent could decide in a sophisticated
way, making an analysis of what his actions would be in the future, as a consequence of
his changing preferences. For instance, Pollak (1968) gave the right solution to the Strotz
problem for both, naive and sophisticated agents under a logarithmic utility function.
Although the problem was first presented in a continuous time context (Strotz (1956)),
almost all attention has been given to the discrete time setting introduced by Phelps and
Pollak (1968). This is probably a consequence of the non-existence of a well-stated system
of equations giving a general method for solving the problem, at least for sophisticated
agents. There is no analogy to Pontryagin’s maximum principle in this case if the discount
factor is non constant. Therefore, each particular problem has been solved individually.
This was the case of the Strotz model solved by Pollak in 1968, both for naive and sophis-
ticated agents. Barro (1999) studied a modified version of the neoclassical growth model
by including a variable rate of time preference. In his method for solving the problem,
he employed a type of the well-known needle variations used in the proof of Pontryagin’s
maximum principle, but just in the initial period of time. In his analysis for a logarith-
mic utility function, he proved that the equilibrium features a constant effective rate of
time preference and is observationally equivalent to the standard model. Unfortunately,
the nice properties obtained for the logarithmic utility function - equivalence of solutions
of naive and sophisticated agents (Pollak, 1968) and observational equivalence with the
standard model (Barro, 1999) - seem to be a particularity of this utility function, and not
the general rule.
For the case of naive agents, Pontryagin’s maximum principle can be used in order to
find the decision rule at time t of a t-agent. In fact, one should solve a standard optimal
control problem for each time t ∈ [0, T ]. Unfortunately, this method cannot be used if
the agent is sophisticated. Instead, Markov subgame perfect equilibria must be found.
This prompts the use of a dynamic programming approach, applying a kind of Bellman
optimality principle.
In fact, Karp (2007) recently introduced a new method for analyzing the solutions in a
non-constant-discount continuous time setting, deriving a dynamic programming equation
(DPE) in an infinite time horizon problem. A different approach was adopted in Harris and
Laibson (2005). In this paper we extend the results by Karp to a non-constant discounting
problem in finite horizon. Special attention is paid to the free terminal time case. While
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the applicability of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the case with non constant
discounting seems to be, in principle, problematic, since it includes the solution as a
data, it can be nevertheless be easily used in order to check the observational equivalence
with a problem with constant discounting. Moreover, we suggest a guessing method for
constructing the solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. The dynamic
programming equation is derived in Section 3, both in discrete and continuous settings.
The observability equivalence problem is briefly analyzed, and a simple example illus-
trates how Pontryagin’s maximum principle and the derived Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation can be used in order to describe the solution for naive and sophisticated agents,
respectively. Section 4 is devoted studying the problem with free terminal time, in sev-
eral different contexts with some kind of commitment, or without commitment at all. In
Section 5 we solve Strotz’s model, an eating cake problem of a nonrenewable resource
with non-constant discounting. It is shown how the coincidence of solutions for naive and
sophisticated agents in a log-utility setting is lost if the time horizon is freely fixed by the
agent. Finally, Section 6 contains the main conclusions of the paper.
2 The model: non constant discounting in a
finite horizon planning
Let x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the vector of state variables, and u = (u1, . . . , um) the vector of
control (or decision) variables. In the conventional model, agent preferences in time t take
the form
Ut =
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+ e−ρ(T−t)F (x(T )) ,
where the state variables evolve according to the state (or control) equations x˙i(s) =
f i(x(s), u(s), s), xi(t) = xit, for i = 1, . . . , n. In order to maximize Ut, we must solve an
optimal control problem and, since the discount rate is constant, the solution becomes
time consistent.
Now, following Karp (2007), let us assume that the instantaneous discount rate is non-
constant, but a function r(s) at time s, s ∈ [t, T ]. Function r(s) is usually assumed to be
non-increasing. Although this is the most reasonable choice in most decision problems,
this assumption is not necessary for our model, and we will not make it. The discount
factor at time t used to evaluate a payoff at time t+τ , τ ≥ 0, is θ(τ) = exp (− ∫ τ
0
r(s) ds
)
.
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Then, the objective of the agent at time t (the t-agent) will be
max
{u(s)}
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+ θ(T − t)F (x(T )) , (1)
x˙i(s) = f i(x(s), u(s), s) , xi(t) = xit , for i = 1, . . . , n . (2)
In Problem (1-2), we assume the usual regularity conditions, i.e., functions L, F and
f i are continuously differentiable in all their arguments.
Remark 1 In Barro (1999), the discount factor was defined as e−[ρτ+φ(τ)], where φ(τ)
includes the aspects of time preference that cannot be described by the standard exponential
factor e−ρτ . Note that our expression of θ(τ) is equivalent to the one in Barro (1999).
Indeed, in the Barro’s model, the instantaneous rate of time preference at the time distance
τ is given by ρ + φ′(τ), compared with r(τ) in the definition of Karp (2007). By writing
r(τ) = ρ+ φ′(τ), we can identify both discount factors.
In this paper we will not assume any particular discount function. In the discrete
time case, most papers work with the so-called hyperbolic discounting, first proposed by
Phelps and Pollak (1968). The utility function is defined as
Ut = ut + β(δut+1 + δ
2ut+2 + δ
3ut+3 + · · · ) ,
where 0 < β ≤ 1, and uk denotes the utility in period k. In fact, Laibson (1997) argues
that β would be substantially less than one on an annual basis, perhaps between one-half
and two-thirds.
As a natural extension of the discount function above to the continuous setting, Barro
(1999) suggested the instantaneous discount rate r(τ) = ρ+ be−γτ , where b ≥ 0 and γ > 0.
Another natural choice for the discount factor comes from another application of Prob-
lem (1-2). Consider two agents with the same instantaneous utility and final functions,
but different constant discount rates. Fro instance, this is the case of the model of re-
newable resources and economic sustainability studied (in an infinite horizon setting) by
Li and Lofgren (2000), where agents are classified into conservationists (for which the in-
stantaneous discount rate is zero) and non conservationists (which have a strictly positive
instantaneous discount rate). If the agents have utility functions
U1t =
∫ T
t
e−ρ1(s−t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+ e−ρ1(T−t)F (x(T )) , and
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U2t =
∫ T
t
e−ρ2(s−t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+ e−ρ2(T−t)F (x(T )) ,
then the utility function of a Pareto optimum will be given by
UPt = λU
1
t + (1− λ)U2t =
=
∫ T
t
(
λe−ρ1(s−t) + (1− λ)e−ρ2(s−t))L(x(s), u(s), s) ds+
+
(
λe−ρ1(T−t) + (1− λ)e−ρ2(T−t))F (x(T ) ,
where 0 < λ < 1. In this case, the discount factor is a linear combination of exponentials
with constant but different discount rates,
θ(s− t) = (λe−ρ1(s−t) + (1− λ)e−ρ2(s−t)) = ef(s−t) ,
where f(τ) = ln
(
λe−ρ1τ + (1− λ)e−ρ2τ).
3 Dynamic programming equation
We will first solve a discretized version of this model for a sophisticated agent, and then
extend the solution to a continuous time setting.
3.1 Dynamic programming equation in discrete time
We will derive the dynamic programming equation in a discretized version of Problem
(1-2), following a procedure similar to the one used in Karp (2007).
Let us divide the interval [0, T ] into n periods of constant length , in such a way
that we identify ds = , and s = j, for j = 0, 1, . . . , n. Then equation (2) becomes
x(s+)−x(s) = f(x(s), u(s), s). Denoting by x(j) = xj, u(k) = uk (j, k = 0, . . . , n−1),
the objective of the agent in period t = j will be
max
{ui}
Vj =
n−j−1∑
i=0
θ(i)L(x(i+j), u(i+j), (i+ j))+ θ((n− j))F (x(T )) , (3)
xi+1 = xi + f(xi, ui, i) , i = j, . . . , n− 1 , xj given . (4)
Let us state the dynamic programming algorithm for the discrete problem (3-4). In
the final period, t = n = T , we define V ∗n = F (x(T )), as usual. For j = n − 1, the
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optimal value for (3) will be given by the solution to the problem
V ∗(n−1)(x(n−1), (n− 1)) = max{u(n−1)}
{
L(x(n−1), u(n−1), (n− 1))+ θ1V ∗n
}
xn = x(n−1) + f(x(n−1), u(n−1), (n− 1)) .
If
u∗(n−1)(x(n−1), (n− 1)) = arg max{u(n−1)}
{
L(x(n−1), u(n−1), (n− 1))+
+θ1V
∗
n (x(n−1) + f(x(n−1), u(n−1), (n− 1)))
}
,
let us denote
H(n−1)(x(n−1), (n− 1)) = L(x(n−1), u∗(n−1)(x(n−1), (n− 1)), (n− 1)) . (5)
In general, for j = 1, . . . , n− 1, the optimal value in (3) can be written as
V ∗j (xj, j) = max{uj}
L(xj, uj, j)+
+
n−j−1∑
k=1
θkH(j+k)(x(j+k), (j + k))+ θn−jV ∗n (6)
with x(j+1) = xj + f(xj, uj, j). Since
V ∗j+1(x(j+1), (j + 1)) =
n−j−2∑
i=0
θiH(j+i+1)(x(j+i+1), (j + i+ 1))+ θn−j−1V ∗n , (7)
then, solving θn−j−1V ∗n (xn) in (7) and substituting in (6) we obtain:
Proposition 1 For every initial state x0, the equilibrium value V
∗(xt) of problem (3-4)
can be obtained as the solution of the following algorithm, which proceeds backward in time
from period n− 1 to period 0:
V ∗n = F (x(T )) , (8)
θn−j−1V ∗j (xj, j) = max{uj}
{θn−j−1L(xj, uj, j) +
+
n−j−1∑
k=1
(θn−j−1θk − θn−jθk−1)H(j+k)(x(j+k), (j + k))+ (9)
+θn−jV ∗j+1(x(j+1), (j + 1))
}
,
x(j+1) = xj + f(xj, uj, j) , (10)
for j = 0, . . . , n− 1.
Equations (8-10) are the equilibrium dynamic programming equations in discrete time,
and their solution is the Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) solution to problem (3-4).
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3.2 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
In this paper we are interested in deriving a dynamic programming equation in continuous
time. In this section we will obtain a modified Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the
problem with non-constant discounting, which reduces to the usual HJB equation in case
where the discount rate is constant. The idea of our derivation consists in taking the limit
 → 0 of the dynamic programming equation of the discrete stage equilibrium problem
described in Proposition 1.
Let W (x, t) represent the value function of the t-agent, with initial condition x(t) = x.
We assume that W (x, t) is continuously differentiable in all its arguments. Since s = j
and x(s+ ) = x(s) + f(x(s), u(s), s), then W (x(t), t) = Vj(xj, j) and
W (x(t+ ), t+ ) = W (x(t), t) +∇xW (x(t), t) · f(x(t), u(t), t)+∇tW (x(t), t)+ o() ,
where lim
→0
o()

= 0. Since θk = exp
(
− ∫ k
0
r(s)ds
)
, then
θn−j = θn−j−1 [1− r((n− j))] + o() = θn−j−1 [1− r(T − t)] + o() ,
θk−1 = θk [1 + r(k)] + o()
and substituting in (9) we obtain
W (x(t), t) = max
{u(t)}
{L(x(t), u(t), t)+W (x(t), t) +∇xW (x(t), t) · f(x(t), u(t), t)+
+∇tW (x(t), t)− r(T − t)W (x(t), t)−K(x(t), t)}+ o() , (11)
where K(x(t), t) is given by
K(x(t), t) =
n−j−1∑
k=1
θ(k) [r(k)− r(T − t)]H(t+k)(x(t+ k), t+ k)+ o(2) . (12)
Dividing equations (11) and (12) by , and taking the limit → 0, n→∞ (with T = n),
we get
r(T − t)W (x(t), t) +K(x(t), t)−∇tW (x(t), t) =
= max
{u}
{L(x(t), u, t) +∇xW (x(t), t) · f(x(t), u, t)} ,
where
K(x(t), t) =
∫ T−t
0
θ(s) [r(s)− r(T − t)]H(x(t+ s), t+ s)ds =
=
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) [r(s)− r(T − t)]H(x(s), s)ds ,
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and H(x(s), s) = L(x(s), u∗(x(s), s), s).
Finally, note that for the equilibrium rule u∗ = u∗(x(s), s), s ∈ [t, T ], since x˙(t+ s) =
f(x(t + s), u(t + s), t + s), we can write x(t + s) as a function of x(t) and s (x(t + s) =
x(x(t), s)). Therefore, H(x(t+ s), t+ s) = H(x(t), s).
Hence, we have proved:
Theorem 1 Let W (x, t) be the value function of the t-agent. If W (x, t) is continuously
differentiable in (x, t), it satisfies the dynamic programming equation
r(T − t)W (x, t) +K(x, t)−∇tW (x, t) = (13)
= max
{u}
{L(x, u, t) +∇xW (x, t) · f(x, u, t)} ,
W (x, T ) = F (x) , (14)
where
K(x, t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) [r(s− t)− r(T − t)]H(x, s)ds . (15)
Assume also that u∗(x, t) attains the maximum in Equation (13). If, for each pair (x, t),
the state trajectory x∗(s) solution to x˙(s) = f(x(s), u∗(x(s), s), s) with initial condition
x(t) = x is unique, and the control trajectory u∗(x(t), t) is piecewise continuous in t, then
W (x, t) is called the Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE), and the control trajectory u∗(t),
t ∈ [0, T ] is the equilibrium rule.
Remark 2 Note that in the case of constant discount rate r(t) = r, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
we recover the usual Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
Remark 3 It is clear from condition (14) and the differentiability assumption of the value
function W (x, t) that, if the terminal state is free, we recover the well-known transversality
condition
∇xW (x∗, T ) = ∇xF (x∗(T ))
In particular, if there is no final function (F (x) = 0), then ∇xW (x, T ) = 0.
Remark 4 Assume now that, in addition to the initial state x(0) = x0, the final state
x(T ) = xT is given. In this case, the terminal condition W (T, x) = F (x) makes no sense
(x(T ) is fixed). Instead, we have the extra condition x(T ) = xT in order to integrate the
differential equations.
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The standard HJB equation for Problem (1-2) with t = 0 is
r(t)W (x, t)−∇tW (x, t) = max{u} {L(x, u, t) +∇xW (x, t) · f(x, u, t)} . (16)
In our framework of changing preferences, the solution to this equation corresponds to
the so-called commitment solution, in the sense that it is optimal as long as the agent
can precommit his future behaviour at time t = 0. Note that, when comparing equations
(16) and (13), there are two differences. First, a new term K(x, t) appears in equation
(13), and second the term r(t)W (x, t) in (16) changes to r(T − t)W (x, t).
In principle, the modified Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation given by (13-15) appears
not to be very useful, insofar as it includes implicitly the equilibrium rule (that is, the
solution to the problem) in the definition of K(x, t) (via H(x, s)). In this paper we
will illustrate with several examples how equations (13-15) can be used in order to solve
particular problems, and suggest a guessing method for searching for the solution, as well
as analyzing nice properties such as the observational equivalence with a problem with
non-constant discounting (this is a very important property in an economic context).
Anyway, there is a case in which equations (13-15) are greatly simplified: when the
“utility function” L(x, u, t) = 0, i.e., the Mayer problem in non constant discounting. This
situation occurs in some economic problems, in which one is concerned about maximizing
a final value after, for instance, a saved quantity subsequent to an investment or trading
period of time. In this case, function K(x(t), t) vanishes and the HJB equation describing
the MPE becomes:
Corollary 1 If the value function of a t-agent for the problem
max
{u(s)}
θ(T − t)F (x(T )) , (17)
x˙(s) = f(x(s), u(s), s) , x(t) = xt (18)
is continuously differentiable, then it verifies the partial differential equation
r(T − t)W (x, t)−∇tW (x, t) = max{u} {∇xW (x, t) · f(x, u, t)} ,
with W (x, T ) = F (x).
In contrast, let us now assume that there is no final function. Then equations (13-15)
can be written as follows:
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Corollary 2 If, in Problem (1-2), there is no final function (F (x(T )) = 0), then the HJB
equation can be written as
K¯(x, t)−∇tW (x, t) = max{u} {L(x, u, t) +∇xW (x, t) · f(x, u, t)} ,
where
K¯(x, t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)r(s− t)H(x, s)ds
and W (x, T ) = 0.
Proof: Along the equilibrium path,
W (x, t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)H(x, s)ds+ θ(T − t)F (x(T ) .
Therefore
K(x, t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)r(s− t)H(x, s)ds− r(T − t)
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)H(x, s)ds =
= K¯ − r(T − t)W (x, t)− θ(T − t)r(T − t)F (x(T )) .
If F (x(T )) = 0, then the result follows by substituting the expression above in (13). 
3.3 Observational equivalence with a standard model
under constant discounting
Barro (1999) noted that, in an infinite horizon context, the neoclassical growth model
with variable rate of time preference and log utility is observationally equivalent (for a
sophisticated agent) to the standard model, in the sense that there exists a constant rate
for which the optimal control rule coincides with that under non-constant discounting.
His proof consisted in constructing explicitly the solution to the problem, guessing for a
particular form of the solution.
It is clear that equations (13-15) can be easily used in order to solve the problem
of observational equivalence, once the solution of the problem for an arbitrary constant
discount rate has been obtained. It suffices to check if the solution of the problem with
constant rate satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (13-15). This provides a
first and straightforward application of the dynamic programming equation derived above.
In fact, we will use this method in the examples discussed in this paper.
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In general, let us consider the standard model with constant discounting
max
{u(s)}
∫ T
t
e−ρ(s−t)L(x(s), u(s), s) ds , x˙(s) = f(x(s), u(s), s) , x(t) = xt . (19)
Problem (1-2) will be observationally equivalent to Problem (19) if, and only if, the
control (or equilibrium) rules obtained as solution to the HJB equations
r(T − t)W +K −∇tW = max
u
{L+∇xW · f} , W (xT , T ) = F (xT , T ) (20)
and
ρV −∇tV = max
u
{L+∇xV · f} , V (xT , T ) = F (xT , T ) , (21)
coincide. If the hessian matrix
(
∂2(L+∇xW · f)
∂ua∂ub
)
, a, b = 1, . . . ,m, is non singular,
we can solve the equilibrium rule u∗ = u∗(x,∇xW (x, t), t) from the right hand term of
(20). In a similar way, if the hessian matrix
(
∂2(L+∇xV · f)
∂ua∂ub
)
, a, b = 1, . . . ,m, is non
singular, we can solve the feedback control law u∗ = u∗(x,∇xV (x, t), t) from the right
hand term of (21). It is clear that, if Problems (1-2) and (19) have the same solution,
then u∗(x, t) = u∗(x,∇xW (x, t), t) = u∗(x,∇xV (x, t), t). This is naturally satisfied if
∇xW = ∇xV , in whose case the right hand terms of equations (20) and (21) coincide.
Now, if ∇xW = ∇xV , then W (x, t) = V (x, t) + γ(t) and therefore
ρV (x, t)−∇tV (x, t) = r(T − t)W (x, t)−∇tW (x, t) +K(x, t) =
= r(T − t)(V (x, t) + γ(t))−∇tV (x, t)− γ′(t) +K(x, t) .
Hence, if there exists a function γ′(t) and a constant ρ such that
K(x, t) = γ′(t)− r(T − t)γ(t) + (ρ− r(T − t))V (x, t) , (22)
Problem (1-2) will be observationally equivalent to Problem (19). For instance, if V (x, t) =
W (x, t), γ(t) = 0 and condition (22) becomes K = (ρ− r(T − t))W .
In particular, if the functions fi(x, u, t), i = 1, . . . n, defining the control equations
are affine in the control variables, i.e., fi(x, u, t) =
∑m
a=1 g
a
i (x, t)ua + hi(x, t) (this is a
very common situation in economics models), n = m (the number of state and control
variables coincide) and rank(hai ) = n, then necessarily ∇xW = ∇xV . This is the case, for
instance, of the (neoclassical growth) Ramsey model, where there are just one state and
one control variables.
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Remark 5 In the limit T →∞, if the Problem (1-2) is autonomous (L and f are time-
independent), an standard argument shows that W (x, t) = W (x). Then, from equations
(13) and (15) we recover the dynamic programming equation describing the MPE obtained
in Karp (2007). In this case, if r¯ = limt→∞ r(t) (or, following Karp, r¯ is the long
term discount rate), condition (22) becomes K(x) = −rγ + (ρ− r¯)W (x) or, equivalently,
∇xK(x) = (ρ − r¯)∇xV (x). If n = m = 1, the effective discount rate is ρ = r¯ + K
′(x)
V ′(x)
.
For instance, if f(x, u) = h(x) − u, then V ′(x) = Lu(x, u) and condition (22) becomes
K ′(x)
Lu(x, u)
= constant, which is precisely the condition derived by Karp for the Ramsey
model (the assumption Lx = 0 is no longer necessary).
In the discussion above, we follow the definition of observational equivalence intro-
duced in Barro (1999). However, it seems interesting, both from a mathematical and
economical point of view, to study if Problem (1-2) is observationally equivalent to a
problem such as 19, but for a different Lagrangian L (that is, a different instantaneous
utility function). This problem is closely related to the inverse problem of variational
calculus, a long-standing problem in mathematical physics, first posed in 1887 by H.
Helmholtz, which has received renewed interest in the last thirty years, when substantial
progress has been recorded.
3.4 A simple example
Let us illustrate with a simple example how equations (13-15) can be used in order to
solve particular problems with non-constant discounting. This example will provide some
insight into how the non-constant discount factor modifies, via the new term K(x, t),
the solution of a similar problem with a constant discount factor. In fact, we suggest a
guessing method in order to find a solution. Moreover, we obtain impossibility results for
the observational equivalence in this example, both for sophisticated and for naive agents.
Let us consider the following problem:
min
{u}
∫ T
t
1
2
u2θ(s− t) ds , (23)
x˙(s) = u(s) , x(t) = xt > 0 , x(T ) = 0 . (24)
In the case of constant discounting, θ(τ) = e−rτ , the optimal solution to the optimal
control problem is
u∗(t) = −r e
rt
erT − ertx
∗(t) , x∗(t) = x0
erT − ert
erT − 1 . (25)
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Note that the feedback control law can be expressed as a linear function in the state
variable x.
Solution for a naive agent:
If the discount factor is non constant, and the agent is naive, the t-agent will solve Problem
(23-24) as a standard optimal control problem. The solution is
u(s) = − [θ(s− t)]
−1∫ T
t
[θ(τ − t)]−1 dτ
xt . (26)
Since the s-agent will not be time consistent with this solution for s > t (he will change
the decision rule continuously), the feedback control law (26) will be satisfied only for
s = t in general, and therefore
u∗(t) = − xt∫ T
t
[θ(s− t)]−1 ds
. (27)
Note that the solution for the problem of a naive agent is non-observationally equivalent
to a standard problem with constant discounting: the feedback control rules (25) and (27)
coincide if, and only if,
1
r
[
er(T−t) − 1] = ∫ T
t
[θ(s− t)]−1 ds =
∫ T−t
0
[θ(τ)]−1 dτ
for every t ∈ [0, T ], i.e.,
1
r
[ers − 1] =
∫ s
0
[θ(τ)]−1 dτ ,
and differentiating with respect to s, we obtain θ(s) = e−rs.
Solution for a sophisticated agent:
If the decision maker is sophisticated, Equation (13) becomes
r(T − t)W (x, t) +K(x, t)−Wt(x, t) = max{u}
{
−1
2
u2 +Wx(x, t)u
}
.
By maximizing the right hand term of the expression above, we obtain the control law
u∗(x, t) = Wx(x, t), and the HJB equation becomes
r(T − t)W (x, t) +K(x, t)−Wt(x, t) = 1
2
W 2x (x, t) . (28)
From (25), it seems natural to assume that the non constancy of the discount factor will
affect only the time dependence of the control law. Therefore, let us check if there exists
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a function λ(t) such that the feedback control law u(x, t) = λ(t)x is a solution of the
nonlinear partial differential equation (28) with the final condition W (0, T ) = 0.
Since Wx(x, t) = u = λ(t)x, then W (x, t) =
1
2
λ(t)x2+µ(t) and equation (28) becomes
K(x, t) = −r(T − t)
(
1
2
λ(t)x2 + µ(t)
)
+
1
2
λ′(t)x2 + µ′(t) +
1
2
λ2(t)x2 , (29)
where
K(x, t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(s− t)− r(T − t)]
[
−1
2
(u∗(xt, s))2
]
ds .
The solution to the state equation x˙(s) = u = λ(s)x(s) with the initial condition x(t) = xt
is x(s) = exp(
∫ s
t
λ(τ)dτ), hence u∗(xt, s) = λ(s)xte
∫ s
t λ(τ)dτ and
K(x, t) = −1
2
x2t
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(s− t)− r(T − t)]λ2(s)e2
∫ s
t λ(τ)dτdτ . (30)
The dependence on x in equations (29-30) implies
µ′(t)− r(T − t)µ(t) = 0 and
λ′(t)− r(T − t)λ(t) + λ2(t) = (31)
= −
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(s− t)− r(T − t)]λ2(s)e2
∫ s
t λ(τ)dτds .
From the solution of the two equations above we obtain the equilibrium value function
W (x, t) and, therefore, the control law u∗(x, t) = λ(t)x. Then, x(t) = x0 exp(
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds)
and u∗ = x0λ(t) exp(
∫ t
0
λ(s)ds).
Unfortunately, it is clear from this example that searching for an analytic solution in
closed form becomes extremely difficult in general, since an integro-differential equation
should be solved. However, we have illustrated that the general form of the solution in
the standard case is preserved, and this gives us some hints about the searching for a
numerical solution.
Let us study if there exists observational equivalence with a problem with constant
discount factor ρ. From (25) we know that we must simply check if λ(t) = −ρ e
ρt
eρT − eρt
is a solution of equation (31). After integrating and simplifying, we obtain[
1− r(T − t)
ρ
]
eρt(eρT − eρt) =
= [2ρ− r(T − t)]
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)e2ρs ds+ e2ρt − θ(T − t)e2ρT .
16
Although we cannot solve the integral in the right hand term for an arbitrary discount
factor θ(τ), it becomes clear that the equation above will not be satisfied in general
for every t ∈ [0, T ]. Therefore, Problem (23-24) will not be in general observationally
equivalent to a similar problem with constant discounting.
4 Free Terminal Time
In the previous section, and in particular in Theorem 1, we have assumed implicitly that
we are dealing with a standard problem in which the terminal time T is fixed. Let now
us analyze how the transversality conditions in an optimal control problem in which the
terminal time T is freely fixed by the agent are extended to the general context of non
constant discounting. We study the general case in which the final function can also
depend on T , i.e., F = F (x(T ), T ). An interesting question emerges in this context:
who decides when to stop? Recall that, since preferences are changing due to the non
constancy of the discount factor, the agent can be understood as a continuum number of
t agents.
It is clear that, if there is no commitment, the terminal time T is decided by the final
agent (the T -agent in this case), i.e., who decides whether or not to stop, independently
of if the decision maker is sophisticated or naive.
We can also consider the commitment situation in which the 0-agent can fix by contract
the terminal time. In this case, the objective of the 0-agent will be to choose T as the
maximizer of his value function.
In this paper, we study the general framework in which there exists a time t ∈ [0, T ] in
which the t-agent can fix the terminal time T . If t < T , we are in a commitment situation.
If t = T , we assume no commitment at all. Depending on the economic applications we
were interested in, the first or the second settings will be more appropriate.
4.1 No commitment in the terminal time T
It is clear that, if there is no commitment, naive agents will solve the free terminal
time problem by assuming that, at each moment t, they decide the value of T ; that is,
the decision maker at time t will solve a standard optimal control problem where the
terminal time is fixed in such a way that it is optimal from the viewpoint of the t-agent.
Therefore, in general, not only the decisions measured by the control variables will be
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time inconsistent, but also the calculated terminal times.
If the decision maker is sophisticated, we must analyze the game theoretic framework
in which the stopping time is decided by the final agent, who is the one to decide whether
or not to stop. In this section we analyze section the case when the state variables at
time T are free. With fixed final states, in Section 5 we will propose and illustrate with
an example a method for solving the free terminal time problem.
Let T ∗ be the stopping time. Since T ∗ is fixed by the T ∗-agent, he will compare the
value F (x(T ∗), T ∗) obtained if he decides to stop in T ∗ with the value obtained if he
decides to continue his (consumption, investment) activity. Moreover, necessarily all the
previous t-agents (t ≤ T ∗) will prefer to continue until T = T ∗.
LetW T (x(T ∗), T ∗) denote the valuation for the T ∗-agent of the problem with terminal
time T (recall that W (x, t) represents the valuation from the perspective of the t-agent).
Then T ∗ will be optimal for the T ∗-agent if
F (x(T ∗), T ∗) = max
T ′≥T ∗
W T
′
(x(T ∗), T ∗) , (32)
where T ′ represents the optimal stopping times if the T ∗ decides to continue. In a similar
way, a condition assuring that previous T -agents prefer to continue until T ∗ is that
F (x(T ), T ) ≤ W T ∗(x(T ), T ) , for every T ≤ T ∗ . (33)
Using these ideas, we can state the following result:
Proposition 2 In Problem (1-2) with T free, if the agent is sophisticated and there is no
commitment in the terminal time, then the following condition is satisfied in the terminal
time T ∗: [
L+
∂F
∂x
· f
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
=
[
r(0)F − ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
.
Proof: First of all, the terminal time T ∗ is optimum from the perspective of the T ∗-agent.
If the optimum for the (T ∗ + )-agent,  > 0, is to stop, then from the optimality of T ∗
we get F (x(T ∗), T ∗) ≥ W T ∗+(x(T ∗), T ∗). In this case,
F (x(T ∗), T ∗) ≥
∫ T ∗+
T ∗
θ(s− T ∗)L(x, u, s)ds+ θ()F (x(T ∗ + ), T ∗ + ) =
= F (x(T ∗), T ∗) + 
[
L− r(0)F +
(
∂F
∂x
· x˙+ ∂F
∂T
)]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
+ o() , (34)
where we have used that θ(0) = 1 and θ′(0) = −r(0).
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Otherwise, if the (T ∗+)-agent prefers to continue until a new stopping time T ′ ≥ T ∗+
(which will be optimum for a T ′-agent), the optimality of T ∗ for the T ∗-agent implies that
F (x(T ∗), T ∗) ≥ W T ′(x(T ∗), T ∗), where W T ′(x(T ∗ + ), T ∗ + ) ≥ F (x(T ∗ + ), T ∗ + ).
Therefore,
F (x(T ∗), T ∗) ≥ W T ′(x(T ∗), T ∗) = L(x(T ∗), T ∗)+W T ′(x(T ∗ + ), T ∗ + ) + o() ≥
≥ L(x(T ∗), T ∗)+ F (x(T ∗ + ), T ∗ + ) + o() =
= F (x(T ∗), T ∗) + 
[
L− r(0)F +
(
∂F
∂x
· x˙+ ∂F
∂T
)]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
+ o() . (35)
Therefore, from (32) and taking the limit → 0+ in (34-35) we obtain[
L− r(0)F + ∂F
∂x
· f + ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗+
≤ 0 . (36)
In a similar way, a (T ∗ − )-agent,  > 0, will decide to continue until T ∗ if
F (x(T ∗ − ), T ∗ − ) ≤
∫ T ∗
T ∗−
θ(T ∗ − s)L(x, u, s)ds+ θ()F (x(T ∗), T ∗)
and in the limit case → 0+ we obtain[
L− r(0)F + ∂F
∂x
· f + ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗−
≥ 0 . (37)
The result follows from (36) and (37) (recall that L and F are assumed to be of class C1
in all their arguments). 
Note that, from condition W (x(T ), T ) = F (x(T ), T ), we recover the more familiar
expression [
L+
∂W
∂x
· f
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
=
[
r(0)F − ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
.
In the analysis above we have implicitly assumed that the terminal state x(T ) is free.
4.2 Commitment in the terminal time
Let us now consider the opposite situation to that studied above: the 0-agent, and not
the T -agent, decides when to stop.
If the decision maker is naive, then all we are required to do is to calculate the terminal
time by using the standard transversality condition for the optimal control problem solved
by the 0-agent, and next solve the problem for the t-agents, t > 0, as a problem with
fixed terminal time.
For sophisticated agents we have:
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Proposition 3 Let us consider Problem (1-2) for a sophisticated agent, with the terminal
time T free. If the agent can fix the terminal time at time t = 0, then a necessary condition
for the optimality of T ∗ from the perspective of the 0-agent is[
L+
∂F
∂x
· f
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
=
[
r(T )F − ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
.
Proof: We can adapt the proof given in Hartl and Sethi (1983) for an ordinary optimal
control problem to our generalized setting with non constant discounting.
For a given fixed terminal time T¯ , let (x(t, T¯ ), u(t, T¯ )) be the equilibrium pair. We
define
W˜ (T, T¯ ) =
∫ T
0
θ(t)L(x(t, T¯ ), u(t, T¯ ), t) dt+ θ(T )F (x(T, T¯ ), T ) if T ∈ [0, T¯ ] , and
W˜ (T, T¯ ) =
∫ T¯
0
θ(t)L(x(t, T¯ ), u(t, T¯ ), t) dt+ θ(T )F (x(T¯ , T¯ ), T )+
+
∫ T
T¯
θ(t)L(x(t, T¯ ), u(T¯ , T¯ ), t) dt+ θ(T¯ )F (x(T, T¯ ), T¯ ) if T > T¯ .
Let T ∗ be optimum from the perspective of the 0-agent. The decision rule u(t, T ∗) can
be assumed to be continuous in t = T ∗, and hence x(t, T ∗) is of class C1 with respect to
t in t = T ∗. Then, W˜ (T, T ∗) is continuously differentiable with respect to T in T = T ∗.
It is clear then that a necessary condition for the optimality of T ∗ for the 0-agent is that
0 =
∂W˜ (T, T ∗)
∂T
∣∣∣∣∣
T=T ∗
= θ(T )L+ θ(T )
∂F
∂x
· ∂x
∂T
+ θ′(T )F + θ(T )
∂F
∂T
∣∣∣∣
T=T ∗
and, from θ′(T ∗) = −r(T ∗)θ(T ∗) the result follows. 
4.3 A general result
Finally. let us consider the general case in which there is a unique t, t ∈ [0, T ], such
that the t-agent can decide the terminal time. Then we have the following result for
sophisticated agents.
Theorem 2 In Problem (1-2), with T is free, if the decision maker is sophisticated and
there exists a moment t ∈ [0, T ] such that the t-agent can fix the terminal time, then if T ∗
is optimum from the perspective of the t-agent, the following condition must be satisfied:[
L+
∂F
∂x
· f
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
=
[
r(T − t)F − ∂F
∂T
]∣∣∣∣
T ∗
.
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Proof: If t = T , we are in the no commitment situation and the result follows from
Proposition 2. If t = 0, we recover the result proved in Proposition 3. It remains to
prove the theorem for t ∈ (0, T ). However, in this case it is easy to see that the proof of
Proposition 3 can be adapted in such a way that Theorem 2 follows. 
5 Strotz’s model revisited
The model used by Strotz (1956) in order to illustrate the main features of non constant
discounting is essentially the Ramsey model with no production function in finite horizon,
and can be understood as a problem of consumption of a non renewable resource. Pollak
(1968) solved this model by constructing the solution beginning from a discrete setting and
taking the limit to the continuum. Actually, he solved the problem from the perspective
of naive agents, and then showed that naive and sophisticated agents have the same
solution for this particular problem. In this section, we will derive the solution for naive
and sophisticated agents, by applying the guessing method suggested in Section 3.4 to
equations (13-15). If the terminal time is fixed, we will recover the results by Pollak. If
a linear production function is included in the model, we show that the main properties
of the solutions are preserved. However, this is not the case if the terminal time is freely
chosen by the decision maker.
5.1 Strotz model with log-utility and fixed terminal time
The model studied by Strotz is the following:
max
c
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ln c ds , for t ∈ [0, T ] , (38)
k˙ = −c , k(t) = kt , k(T ) = 0 . (39)
If the discount factor is constant, θ(s− t) = e−r(s−t), the solution to the problem is
k∗(t) = k0
e−rt − e−rT
1− e−rT , c
∗(t) = k0r
e−rt
1− e−rT . Note that we can write c
∗ = rk∗ + µ, where
µ = k0r
e−rT
1− e−rT , or c
∗ = λ(t)k∗, where λ(t) =
re−rt
e−rt − e−rT .
The value function can be written as V (k, t) =
1
r
ln (rk + µ) + Aert − 1
r
, where A is
the solution to condition V (0, T ) =
1
r
lnµ+ AerT − 1
r
= 0.
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Alternatively, V (k, t) =
(
Aert +
1
r
)
ln k + g(t), where g(t) is the solution to the dif-
ferential equation g′ − rg = 1 + ln
(
Aert +
1
r
)
.
Solution for a naive agent:
Naive t-agents will solve problem (38-39) using Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The
feedback control law is now
c(s) =
θ(s− t)∫ T
t
θ(τ − t) dτ
kt .
Since the t-agent will no be time consistent for s > t, the actual consumption rule is
obtained for the case s = t from the equation above, and therefore
c∗(t) =
kt∫ T
t
θ(τ − t) dτ
, (40)
recovering easily in this way the solution obtained by Pollak (1968), and showing that
in this case there will be non observational equivalence for every nonconstant discount
function θ(τ). The optimal pair (k∗(t), c∗(t)) is
k∗(t) = k0e
− ∫ t0 [∫ Tτ θ(s−τ) ds]−1 dτ and c∗(t) = k0 e
− ∫ t0 [∫ Tτ θ(s−τ) ds]−1 dτ∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ds
. (41)
Solution for a sophisticated agent:
A sophisticated agent will solve equations (13-15). From equation (13) we obtain
c∗ = (Wk)−1. Therefore,
r(T − t)W +K −Wt = ln c∗ +Wk(−c∗) = −lnWk − 1 . (42)
From the insight obtained in the example discussed in Section 3.4, and the result obtained
in the case of constant discounting, let us conjecture that the feedback control law is given
by c(t) = λ(t)k, for some function λ(t).
Since k(s) = kte
− ∫ st λ(τ) dτ is the solution to k˙(s) = −c(s) with the initial condition
k(t) = kt, then
K =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) [r(s− t)− r(T − t)] ln
(
λ(s)kte
− ∫ st λ(τ) dτ) ds .
Let Λ(t) = (λ(t))−1. Then Wk =
Λ(t)
k
so W (k, t) = Λ(t)ln k + f(t) and substituting in
(42) we obtain
r(T − t)[Λ(t)ln k + f(t)]− Λ′(t)ln k − f ′(t) + 1 + lnΛ(t)− ln k =
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=∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(T − t)− r(s− t)]ln
(
λ(s)e−
∫ s
t λ(τ) dτ
)
ds+
+
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(T − t)− r(s− t)]ln kt ds .
Since the equation above must be satisfied for every k, then
Λ′ − r(T − t)Λ + 1 =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(s− t)− r(T − t)] ds .
Finally, ∫ T
t
θ(s− t)r(s− t) ds = −θ(s− t)|Tt = −θ(T − t) + 1
and by simplifying we obtain
Λ′ − r(T − t)Λ = −θ(T − t)− r(T − t)
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ds .
The general solution of this linear first order differential equation is
Λ(t) = Ae
∫ t
0 r(T−s)ds +
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ds
where, since Λ(T ) = Ae
∫ T
0 r(T−s)ds = Ae
∫ T
0 r(τ)dτ =
A
θ(T )
, then A = θ(T )Λ(T ). Finally, the
terminal condition 0 = k(T ) = Λ(T )c(T ) implies that Λ(T ) = 0 (c(T ) is necessarily
strictly positive) and, therefore, A = 0. In conclusion, Λ(t) =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ds and
c∗(t) =
kt∫ T
t
θ(s− t) ds
,
which coincides with the solution obtained for a naive agent, in agreement with Pollak
(1968).
5.2 The Strotz model with isoelastic utility function
Let us briefly analyze the Strotz model with isoelastic utility function, u(c) = (c1−σ −
1)/(1− σ), σ > 0, instead of u(c) = ln c.
If the discount factor is constant, it is easy to show that
c∗(t) =
r
σ
e−
r
σ
t
e−
r
σ
t − e− rσT kt . (43)
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In the case of non-constant discounting, if the agent is naive, and proceeding as in the
case of the logarithmic instantaneous utility function, the consumption rule becomes
c∗(t) =
kt∫ T
t
[θ(τ − t)] 1σ dτ
. (44)
Once again, it can be checked that no constant discount rate r exists such that solutions
(43) and (44) coincide.
If the agent is sophisticated, u′(c) = c−σ = Wk, so c∗ = W
− 1
σ
k . The HJB becomes
r(T − t)W +K −Wt = W
1− 1
σ
k − 1
1− σ −W
1− 1
σ
k . (45)
Since the feedback control law in the case of constant discounting is linear in kt, we guess
for a control feedback law c = λ(t)k. Now we have
K =
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(s− t)− r(T − t)]
(
λ(s)kte
− ∫ st λ(τ) dτ)1−σ − 1
1− σ ds .
By substituting in (45) and simplifying, we obtain that λ(t) will be the solution to the
integro-differential equation
r(T − t)
1− σ λ
−σ +
σ
1− σ
λ′
λ1+σ
− σ
1− σλ
1−σ =
=
1
1− σ
∫ T
t
θ(s− t)[r(T − t)− r(s− t)](λ(s))1−σe−(1−σ)
∫ s
t λ(τ) dτ ds .
It can be shown that, in general, the solutions obtained in equations (43) and (44) for
constant discounting and a naive agent are non consistent with the integro-differential
equation above. Therefore, naive and sophisticated agents will make different decisions
and they will be, in general, non observationally equivalent to a problem with constant
discount rate.
5.3 An extension: linear production function
If a linear production function is included in the model, the main results obtained for a
logarithmic utility function do not change. Let us solve Problem (38) where equation (39)
is replaced by
k˙ = ak − c , k(t) = kt , k(T ) = 0 (46)
for a positive.
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If the discount factor is constant, θ(s− t) = e−r(s−t), the feedback control rule is again
c∗(t) =
rkt
1− e−r(T−t) .
The same happens for naive and sophisticated agents, where the control law is given
by (40). Naive and sophisticated agents with non-constant discount rate take the same
decisions with time, and they do not coincide with those of decision makers with a constant
discount rate.
5.4 The free terminal time case
Finally, let us solve Problem (38-39) with free terminal time. If a 6= 0 in (46), the problem
is solved in a similar way.
First of all, let us solve the problem for a constant discount rate. In this case, we
must impose the standard transversality condition H|t=T = 0. Equivalently, note that
the value function V (k0, 0) is given, as a function of T , by
V (k0, 0) =
∫ T
0
e−rt
[
ln (k0r)− rt− ln
(
1− e−rT )] dt .
Therefore, in the free terminal time case, V ′(T ) = 0 implies that T is the solution to the
nonlinear equation ln
(
1− e−rT )+ rT = ln (rk0)− 1. Note that c(T ) = e.
Solution for a naive agent:
A naive t-agent will solve Problem (38-39) by applying the control rule (40),
c∗(t) =
kt∫ Tt
t
θ(τ − t) dτ
, (47)
where the terminal time Tt is calculated by solving the standard optimal control problem
(38-39) with free terminal time. By applying the conditions of the Pontryagin’s maximum
principle to the Hamiltonian function Ht = θ(Tt− t)ln c− pc with initial condition k(t) =
kt, where p is the co-state variable, and using the well-known transversality condition
Ht|Tt = θ(Tt−t)ln c(Tt)−p(Tt)c(Tt) = 0, after several calculations we obtain the condition
characterizing the value of Tt
θ(Tt − t)kt = e
∫ Tt
t
θ(s− t) ds ,
and from the expression of kt given by (41) we obtain
k0θ(Tt − t)e−
(
1+
∫ t
0 [
∫ Tt
s θ(τ−s) dτ]
−1
ds
)
=
∫ Tt
t
θ(s− t) ds . (48)
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For instance, let us solve the problem for the discount function θ(τ) = 1 − µτ , for
µ ≥ 0. In this case, the instantaneous discount factor is given by r(s) = µ/(1−µs), which
is an increasing function in s (we assume that, along the horizon planning, 1 − µs >
0). Therefore, this will not be a reasonable discount factor for most of applications.
However, we choose it in our calculations for simplicity’s sake. By substituting in (48)
and simplifying we easily obtain
2(1− µ(Tt − t))kt = e(Tt − t)(2− µ(Tt − t)) .
For example, the 0-agent will choose T0 as the solution to
2(1− µT0)k0 = eT0(2− µT0) . (49)
In the limit µ = 0 we obtain T0 = k0/e. If µ > 0,
T0 =
µk0 + e−
√
µ2k20 + e
2
eµ
.
In general,
Tt − t = µkt + e−
√
µ2k2t + e
2
eµ
.
Note that θ(Tt − t) > 0, for every t ∈ [0, TT ]. Moreover, since ∂(Tt − t)
∂kt
> 0 and k(t) is a
decreasing function on t, then Tt − t is a decreasing function on t.
Solution for a sophisticated agent:
Finally, let us solve the problem for a sophisticated decision maker. Since we have the
final condition k(T ) = 0, the problem does not verify the conditions of Theorem 2.
Let T ∗ be the stopping time. Then, T ∗ is optimal time from the viewpoint of the
T ∗-agent. Let T ∈ (T ∗ − , T ∗ + ),  > 0. In the limit  → 0+, the agent discounts at
the constant instantaneous discount rate r(0). Therefore, if r(t) is a continuous function,
we can assume that the terminal-agent discounts in a neighborhood of T ∗ at r(0), and
it is optimal for him to stop at time T ∗. Hence, it seems natural to analyze the critical
consumption level c for which a decision maker with constant discount rate r(0) decides
to stop. This consumption level will coincide with the value of c(T ∗) for our problem with
non-constant discounting, since in the limit → 0+ the T ∗ -agent discount rate is precisely
r(0).
From the discussion above, we propose the following method for solving the problem
for a sophisticated agent under no commitment if the terminal time T is free.
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1. We first solve the optimal control problem with free terminal time for the constant
discount rate r(0). If T is the optimal terminal time for this problem (which is
calculated by using the standard transversality condition), let c(T ) = c¯ be the
critical consumption level.
2. The problem with non-constant discount rate is solved by searching for the solution
to the HJB equation (13-15) with the additional final condition c(T ) = c¯.
In Strotz’s model, we have already obtained that, for any constant discount rate,
c¯ = c(T ) = e. Therefore, following the previous method, we impose the condition c∗(T ∗) =
c¯ = e, where c∗(t) is given by equation (40).
For instance, for the discount function θ(τ) = 1 − µτ , 0 ≤ µ ≤ 2e/k0, from the
condition above we obtain
T =
2k0
2e+ µk0
. (50)
The conditions on the parameter µ assure us that θ(T ) ≥ 0.
Note that the value of T obtained for a sophisticated agent under no commitment in
the terminal time (50) does not coincide with that of a naive agent if commitment is not
allowed (see, for instance, equation (49) for the 0-agent), unless µ = 0. Therefore, the
solutions for naive and sophisticated agents do not coincide in the case of free terminal
time.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have obtained the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for sophisticated
agents in a finite horizon dynamic optimization problem with non-constant discounting. In
our derivation we have adapted the results in Karp (2007) for autonomous infinite horizon
problems. Conditions for the observational equivalence with an associated problem with
constant discount rate (which is solved by using the standard techniques of optimal control
theory) have been analyzed.
Special attention has been paid to the case of free terminal case for sophisticated
agents. If the final state is free, we have summarized in Theorem 2 the different transver-
sality conditions corresponding to several contexts, depending on if there exists some kind
of commitment (there exists a moment t such that the t-agent can decide the terminal
time) or there is no commitment at all (and hence the decision about when to stop is
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adopted by the final agent). If the final state is fixed, we have suggested, from economic
insight, a procedure for solving the free terminal time case for some particular problems.
Several examples have been given in order to illustrate the applicability of the derived
HJB equation. In particular, we have reproduced the results by Pollak (1968) for the
Strotz’s model. Some extensions of this model have been also considered. The most
interesting one is, probably, the free terminal case. In all the examples we have compared
the results for both, naive and sophisticated agents. The solution for naive agents has
been obtained by adapting the Pontryagin’s maximum principle to our particular problem,
whereas for the results for sophisticated agents we have used the a guessing method
combined with the HJB equation derived in the paper.
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